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Abstract. mv3 is a new word based stream cipher for encrypting long
streams of data. A direct adaptation of a byte based cipher such as rc4
into a 32- or 64-bit word version will obviously need vast amounts of
memory. This scaling issue necessitates a look for new components and
principles, as well as mathematical analysis to justify their use. Our ap-
proach, like rc4’s, is based on rapidly mixing random walks on directed
graphs (that is, walks which reach a random state quickly, from any
starting point). We begin with some well understood walks, and then in-
troduce nonlinearity in their steps in order to improve security and show
long term statistical correlations are negligible. To minimize the short
term correlations, as well as to deter attacks using equations involving
successive outputs, we provide a method for sequencing the outputs de-
rived from the walk using three revolving buffers. The cipher is fast —
it runs at a speed of less than 5 cycles per byte on a Pentium IV pro-
cessor. A word based cipher needs to output more bits per step, which
exposes more correlations for attacks. Moreover we seek simplicity of
construction and transparent analysis. To meet these requirements, we
use a larger state and claim security corresponding to only a fraction of
it. Our design is for an adequately secure word-based cipher; our very
preliminary estimate puts the security close to exhaustive search for keys
of size ≤ 256 bits.
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1 Introduction
Stream ciphers are widely used and essential in practical cryptography. Most are
custom designed, e.g. alleged rc4 [Sch95, Ch. 16], seal [RC98], scream [HCJ02],
and lfsr-based nessie submissions such as lili-128, snow, and sober [P+03,
Ch. 3]. The vra cipher [ARV95] has many provable properties, but requires
more memory than the rest. We propose some new components and principles
for stream cipher design, as well as their mathematical analysis, and present a
concrete stream cipher called mv3.
To motivate our construction, we begin by considering rc4 in detail. It is an
exceptionally short, byte-based algorithm that uses only 256 bytes of memory.
It is based on random walks (card shuffles), and has no serious attacks. Modern
personal computers are evolving from 32 to 64 bit words, while a growing number
of smaller devices have different constraints on their word and memory sizes.
Thus one may desire ciphers better suited to their architectures, and seek designs
that scale nicely across these sizes. Here we focus on scaling up such random walk
based ciphers. Clearly, a direct adaptation of rc4 would require vast amounts
of memory.
The security properties of most stream ciphers are not based on some hard
problem (e.g., as RSA is based on factoring). One would expect this to be the case
in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, they use components that – to varying
degrees – are analyzable in some idealized sense. This analysis typically involves
simple statistical parameters such as cycle length and mixing time. For example,
one idealizes each iteration of the main loop of rc4 as a step in a random walk
over its state space. This can be modeled by a graph G with nodes consisting
of S256, the permutations on 256 objects, and edges connecting nodes that dif-
fer by a transposition. Thus far no serious deviations from the random walk
assumptions are known. Since storing an element of S232 or S264 is out of the
question, one may try simulations using smaller permutations; however, this is
nontrivial if we desire both competitive speeds and a clear analysis. It therefore
is attractive to consider other options for the underlying graph G.
One of the most important parameters of rc4 is its mixing time. This denotes
the number of steps one needs to start from an arbitrary state and achieve
uniform distribution over the state space through a sequence of independent
random moves. This parameter is typically not easy to determine. Moreover, rc4
keeps a loop counter that is incremented modulo 256, which introduces a memory
over 256 steps. Thus its steps are not even Markovian (where a move from the
current state is independent of earlier ones). Nevertheless, the independence of
moves has been a helpful idealization (perhaps similar to Shannon’s random
permutation model for block ciphers), which we will also adhere to.
We identify and focus on the following problems:
• Problem 1 – Graph Design. How to design graphs whose random walks
are suitable for stream ciphers that work on arbitrary word sizes.
• Problem 2 – Extraction. How to extract bits to output from (the labels
of) the nodes visited by walk.
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• Problem 3 – Sequencing. How to sequence the nodes visited by the walk
so as to diminish any attacks that use relationships (e.g. equations) between
successive outputs.
We now expand on these issues. At the outset, it is important to point out
the desirability of simple register operations, such as additions, multiplications,
shifts, and xor’s. These are crucial for fast implementation, and preclude us
from using many existing constructions of expander graphs (such as those in
[LPS86,HLW06]). Thus part of the cipher design involves new mathematical
proofs and constructions. The presentation of the cipher does not require these
details, which may be found in Appendix A.
High level Design Principles: Clearly, a word based cipher has to output
more bits per step of the algorithm. But this exposes more relationships on the
output sequence, and to mitigate its effect we increase the state size and aim
at security that is only a fraction of the log of the state size. We also tried to
keep our analysis as transparent and construction as simple as possible. Our
key initialization is a bit bulky and in some applications may require further
simplifications, a topic for future research.
1.1 Graph Design: Statistical properties and Non-linearities
In the graph design, one wants to keep the mixing time τ small as a way to keep
the long term correlations negligible. This is because many important properties
are guaranteed for walks that are longer than τ . For example, such a walk visits
any given set S nearly the expected number of times, with exponentially small
deviations (see Theorem A.2). A corollary of this fact is that each output bit is
unbiased.
Thus one desires the optimal mixing time, which is on the order of logN ,
N being the size of the underlying state space. Graphs with this property have
been well studied, but the requirements for stream ciphers are more complicated,
and we are not aware of any work that focuses on this issue. For example, the
graphs whose nodes are Z/2nZ (respectively (Z/2nZ)∗) and edges are (x, x+ gi)
(respectively (x, x · gi)), where gi are randomly chosen and i = O(n), have this
property [AR94]. While these graphs are clearly very efficient to implement,
their commutative operations are quite linear and hence the attacks mentioned
in Problem 3 above can be effective.
To this end, we introduce some nonlinearities into our graphs. For example,
in the graph on Z/2nZ from the previous paragraph, we can also add edges of
the form (x, hx) or (x, xr). This intuitively allows for more randomness, as well
as disrupting relations between successive outputs. However, one still needs to
prove that the mixing time of such a modified graph is still small. Typically this
type of analysis is hard to come by, and in fact was previously believed to be
false. However, we are able to give rigorous proofs in some cases, and empirically
found the numerical evidence to be stronger yet in the other cases. More details
can be found in the Appendices.
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Mixing up the random walks on multiplicative and additive abelian groups
offers a principled way to combine with nonlinearities for an effective defense.
As a practical matter, it is necessary to ensure that our (asymptotic) analysis
applies when parameters are small, which we have verified experimentally.
We remark here that introduction of nonlinearities was the main motivation
behind the construction of the T -functions of Klimov and Shamir ([KS02]). They
showed that the walk generated by a T -function deterministically visits every
n-bit number once before repeating. A random walk does not go through all the
nodes in the graph, but the probability that it returns to a previous node in m
steps tends to the uniform probability at a rate that drops exponentially in m.
It also allows us to analyze the statistical properties as indicated above. (See
Appendix A for more background.)
1.2 Extraction
Obviously, if the nodes are visited truly randomly, one can simply output the
lsb’s of the node, and extraction is trivial. But when there are correlations
among them, one can base an attack on studying equations involving successive
outputs. One solution to this problem is to simultaneously hash a number of
successive nodes using a suitable hashing function, but this will be expensive
since the hash function has to work on very long inputs.
Our solution to the sequencing problem below allows us to instead hash a
linear combination of the nodes in a faster way. A new aspect of our construc-
tion is that our hash function itself evolves on a random walk principle. We
apply suitable rotations on the node labels (to alter the internal states) at the
extraction step to ensure the top and bottom half of the words mix well.
1.3 Sequencing
As we just mentioned, the sequencing problem becomes significant if we wish
to hash more bits to the output (in comparison to rc4). First we ensure that
our graph is directed and has no short cycles. But this by itself is insufficient,
since nodes visited at steps in an interval [t, t + ∆], where ∆ ≪ τ , can have
strong correlations. Also, we wish to maximize the number of terms required
in equations involved in the attacks mentioned in Problem 3. To this end, we
store a short sequence of nodes visited by the walk in buffers, and sequence them
properly. The buffers ensure that any relation among output bits is translated
to a relation involving many nonconsecutive bits of the internal state. Hence,
such relations cannot be used to mount efficient attacks on the internal state of
the cipher.
The study of such designs appear to be of independent interest. We are able to
justify their reduction of correlations via a theorem of [CHJ02] (see Section 4.5).
1.4 Analysis and Performance
We do not have a full analysis of the exact cipher that is implemented. How-
ever, we have ensured that our idealizations are in line with the ones that allow
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rc4 be viewed via random walks. Of course some degree of idealization is nec-
essary because random bits are required to implement any random walk; here
our design resembles that of alleged rc4 [Sch95, Ch. 16]. Likewise, our cipher
involves combining steps from different, independent random walks on the same
underlying graph. We are able to separately analyze these processes, but al-
though combining such steps should intuitively only enhance randomness, our
exact mathematical models hold only for these separate components and hence
we performed numerical tests as well.
Our cipher mv3 is fast on 32 bit processors — it runs at a speed of 4.8 cycles
a byte on Pentium IV, while the speed of rc4 is about 10 cycles a byte. Only
two of the eSTREAM candidates [DC06] are faster on similar architecture.
We evaluated it against some known attacks and we present the details in
Section 4. We note that some of the guess-and-determine attacks against rc4
(e.g. [K+98]) are also applicable against mv3. However, the large size of the
internal state of mv3 makes these attacks much slower than exhaustive key
search, even for very long keys.
The security claim of mv3 is that no attack faster than exhaustive key search
can be mounted for keys of length up to 256 bits.1
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give a description of mv3.
Section 3 contains the design rationale of the cipher. In Section 4 we examine
the security of mv3 with respect to various methods of cryptanalysis. Finally,
Section 5 summarizes the paper. We have also included appendices giving some
mathematical and historical background.
2 The Cipher MV3
In this section we describe the cipher algorithm and its basic ingredients. The
letters in its name stand for “multi-vector”, and the number refers to the three
revolving buffers that the cipher is based upon.
Internal state. The main components of the internal state of mv3 are three
revolving buffers A, B, and C of length 32 double words (unsigned 32-bit inte-
gers) each and a table T that consists of 256 double words. Additionally, there
are publicly known indices i and u (i ∈ [0 . . . 31], u ∈ [0 . . . 255]), and secret
indices j, c, and x (c, x are double words, j is an unsigned byte).
Every 32 steps the buffers shift to the left: A← B, B ← C, and C is emptied.
In code, only the pointers get reassigned (hence the name “revolving”, since the
buffers are circularly rotated).
Updates. The internal state of the cipher gets constantly updated by means
of pseudo-random walks. Table T gets refreshed one entry every 32 steps, via
application of the following two operations:
u← u+ 1
T [u]← T [u] + (T [j]≫ 13).
1 Note that mv3 supports various key sizes of up to 8192 bits. However, the security
claims are only for keys of size up to 256 bits.
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(Symbol x≫ a means a circular rotation to the right of the double word x by
a bits).
In other words, the u-th element of the table, where u sweeps through the
table in a round-robin fashion, gets updated using T [j].
In its turn, index j walks (in every step, which can be idealized as a random
walk) as follows:
j ← j + (B[i] mod 256),
where i is the index of the loop. Index j is also used to update x:
x← x+ T [j],
which is used to fill buffer C by C[i]← (x≫ 8).
Also, every 32 steps the multiplier c is additively and multiplicatively re-
freshed as follows:
c← c+ (A[0]≫ 16)
c← c ∨ 1
c← c2 (can be replaced by c← c3)
Main loop. The last ingredient of the cipher (except for the key setup) is
the instruction for producing the output. This instruction takes the following
form:
output: (x · c) ⊕ A[9i+ 5] ⊕ (B[7i+ 18]≫ 16).
The product x · c of two 32-bit numbers is taken modulo 232.
Putting it all together, the main loop of the cipher is the following:
Input: length len
Output: stream of length len
repeat len/32 times
for i = 0 to 31
j ← j + (B[i] mod 256)
x← x+ T [j]
C[i]← (x≫ 8)
output (x · c)⊕A[9i+ 5]⊕ (B[7i+ 18]≫ 16)
end for
u← u+ 1
T [u]← T [u] + (T [j]≫ 13)
c← c+ (A[0]≫ 16)
c← c ∨ 1
c← c2 (can be replaced by c← c3)
A← B, B ← C
end repeat
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Key initialization.
The key initialization algorithm accepts as inputs a keyK of length keylength,
which can be any multiple of 32 less than or equal to 8192 (we recommend at
least 96 bits), and an initial vector IV of the same length as the key. The key
remains the same throughout the entire encryption session, though the initial
vector changes occasionally. The initial vector is publicly known, but should
not be easily predictable. For example, it is possible to start with a “random”
IV using a (possibly insecure) pseudo-random number generator known to the
attacker, and then increment the IV by 1 every time (see Section 4.2).
The key initialization algorithm is the following:
Input: key key and initial vector IV, both of length keylength double words
Output: internal state that depends on the key and the IV
j, x, u← 0
c← 1
fill A,B,C, T with 0xEF
for i = 0 to 3
for l = 0 to 255
T [i+ l]← T [i+ l] + (key[l mod keylength]≫ 8i) + l.
end for
produce 1024 bytes of mv3 output
encrypt T with the resulting key stream
end for
for i = 4 to 7
for l = 0 to 255
T [i+ l]← T [i+ l] + (IV[l mod keylength]≫ 8i) + l.
end for
produce 1024 bytes of mv3 output
encrypt T with the resulting key stream
end for
Note that when only the IV is changed, only the second half of the key
initialization is performed.
3 Design Rationale
In this section we describe more of the motivating principles behind the new
cipher.
Internal state. The internal state of the cipher has a huge size of more
than 11,000 bits. This makes guess-and-determine attacks on it (like the attack
against rc4 in [K+98]) much slower than exhaustive key search, even for very
long keys. In addition, it also secures the cipher from time/memory tradeoff
attacks trying to invert the function f : State −→ Output, even for large key
sizes. More detail on the security of the cipher with respect to these attacks
appears in Section 4.
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The buffers A, B, C and table T , as well as the indices j, c, and x should
never be exposed. Since the key stream is available to the attacker and depends
on this secret information, the cipher strictly adheres to the following design
principles:
Principle 1. Output words must depend on as many secret words as possible.
Principle 2. Retire information faster than the adversary can exploit it.
As the main vehicle towards these goals, we use random walks (or, more
precisely, pseudo-random walks, as the cipher is fully deterministic).
Updates. The updates of the internal state are based on several simultane-
ously applied random walks. On the one hand, these updates are very simple and
can be efficiently implemented. On the other hand, as shown in Appendix A, the
update mechanism allows one to mathematically prove some randomness prop-
erties of the sequence of internal states. Note that the random walks are inter-
leaved, and the randomness of each one of them relies on the randomness of the
others. Note also that the updates use addition in Z/2nZ and not a bitwise xor
operation. This partially resolves the problem of high-probability short correla-
tions in random walks: In an undirected random walk, there is a high probability
that after a short number of steps the state returns to a previous state, while
in a directed random walk this phenomenon does not exist. For example, if we
would use an update rule x← x⊕ T [j], then with probability 2−8 (rather than
the trivial 2−32) x would return to the same value after two steps. The usage of
addition, which unlike xor is not an involution, prevents this property. However,
in the security proof for the idealized model we use the undirected case, since the
known proofs of rapid mixing (like the theorem of Alon and Roichman [AR94])
refer to that case.
Introducing nonlinearity. In order to introduce some nonlinearity we use
a multiplier c that affects the cipher output in a multiplicative way. The value of
c is updated using an expander graph which involves both addition and multi-
plication, as explained in Appendix A. It is far from clear the squaring or cubing
operation still leaves the mixing time small and our theorem addresses this.
Our update of c involves a step c← c∨ 1. This operation may at a first seem
odd, since it leaks lsb(c) to attacker, who may use it for a distinguishing attack
based only on the lsb of outputs, ignoring c entirely. However, this operation is
essential, since otherwise the attacker can exploit cases where c = 0, which occur
with a relatively high probability of 2−16 due to the c← c2 operation (and last
for 32 steps at a time). In this situation, they can disregard the term x · c and
devise a guess-and-determine attack with a much lower time complexity than
the currently possible one.
Sequencing rule. The goals of this step were explained in section 1.3. Our
output rule is based on the following general structure: The underlying walk
x0, x1, . . . , xn, . . . is transformed into the output y0, y1, . . . , yn, . . . via a linear
transformation:
yi = xni1 ⊕ xni2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xnik .
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Without loss of generality, we assume that the indices are sorted ni1 < ni2 <
· · · < nik. Let N = {nij}. The set N is chosen to optimize the following param-
eters:
1. Minimize the latency and the buffer size required to compute yi. To this end,
we require that there will be two constants m and C, between 64 and 256,
such that i − C ≤ nij ≤ i for each i ≥ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ k. We additionally
constrain nik = i for all i > m;
2. Maximize the minimal size of a set of pairs xi, xi+1 that can be expressed
as a linear combination of y’s. More precisely, we seek to maximize a such
that the following holds for some j1, . . . , jb > m and i1, . . . , ia:
(xi1⊕xi1+1)⊕(xi2⊕xi2+1)⊕· · ·⊕(xia⊕xia+1) = yj1⊕yj2⊕· · ·⊕yjb . (3.1)
Notice that the value of b has not been constrained, since usually this value
is not too high and the attacker can obtain the required data.
Intuitively speaking, the second constraint ensures that if the smallest feasible
a is large enough, no linear properties of the x walk propagate to the y walk.
Indeed, any linear function on the y walk can be expressed as a function on the
x walk. Since the x walk is memoryless, any linear function on a subset of x’s
can be written as a xor of linear functions on the intervals of the walk. Each
such interval can in turn be broken down as a sum of pairs. If a is large enough,
no linear function can be a good distinguisher. Note that we concentrate on the
relation between consecutive values of the state x, since in a directed random
walk such pairs of states seem to be the most correlated ones.
Constructing the set N can be greatly simplified if N has periodic structure.
Experiments demonstrate that for sequences with period 32 and k = 3, a can be
as large as 12. Moreover, the best sequences have a highly regular structure, such
as ni1 = i − (5k mod 16) and ni2 = i − 16 − (3k mod 16), where k = i mod 16.
For larger periods a cannot be computed directly; an analytical approach is
desirable.
As soon as the set of indices is fixed, yi for i > m can be output once xi
becomes available. The size of the buffer should be at least i−nij for any i > m
and j. If N is periodic, retiring older elements can be trivially implemented
by keeping several buffers and rotating between them. We note that somewhat
similar buffers where used recently in the design of the stream cipher Py [BS05].
More precisely, if we choose the period P = 32 and k = 3, i.e. every output
element is an xor of three elements of the walk, the output rule can be imple-
mented by keeping three P -word buffers, A, B, and C. Their content is shifted
to the left every P cycles: A is discarded, B moves to A, and C moves to B. The
last operation can be efficiently implemented by rotating pointers to the three
buffers.
The exact constants chosen for nij in the output rule are chosen to maxi-
mize the girth and other useful properties of the graph of dependencies between
internal variables and the output, which is available to the attacker.
Rotations.
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Another operation used both in the output rule and in the update of the
internal state is bit rotation. The motivation behind this is as follows: all the
operations used in mv3 except for the rotation (that is, bitwise xor, modular
addition and multiplication) have the property that in order to know the k least
significant bits of the output of the operation, it is sufficient to know the k least
significant bits of the input. An attacker can use this property to devise an attack
based on examining only the k least significant bits of the output words, and
disregard all the other bits. This would dramatically reduce the time complexity
of guess-and-determine attacks. For example, if no rotations were used in the
cipher, then a variant of the standard guess-and-determine attack presented in
Section 4 would apply. This variant examines only the least significant byte of
every word, and reduces the time complexity of the attack to the fourth root of
the original time complexity.
One possible way to overcome this problem is to use additional operations
that do not have this problematic property, like multiplication in some other
modular group. However, such operations slow the cipher significantly. The ro-
tations used in mv3 can be efficiently implemented and prevent the attacker
from tracing only the several least significant bits of the words. We note that
similar techniques were used in the stream cipher Sosemanuk [B+05] and in
other ciphers as well.
Key setup. Since the bulk of the internal state is the table T , we concentrate
on intermingling T and the pair (key, IV ). Once T is fully dependent on the key
and the IV , the revolving buffers and other internal variables will necessarily
follow suit.
We have specified that the IV be as long as the key in order to prevent
time/memory tradeoff attacks that try to invert the function g : (key, IV ) −→
Output. The IV is known to the attacker but should not be easily predictable.
One should avoid initializing the IV to zero at the beginning of every encryp-
tion session (as is frequently done in other applications), since this reduces the
effective size of the IV and allows for better time/memory tradeoff attacks. A
more comprehensive study of the security of mv3 with respect to time/memory
tradeoff attacks is presented in Section 4.
We note that the key initialization phase is relatively slow. However, since
the cipher is intended for encrypting long streams of data, the fast speed of
the output stream generation compensates for it. We note that since the IV
initialization phase is also quite slow, the IV should not be re-initialized too
frequently.
4 Security
mv3 is designed to be a fast and very secure cipher. We are not aware of any
attacks on mv3 faster than exhaustive key search even for huge key sizes of more
than 1000 bits (except for the related key attacks in Section 4.6), but have only
made security claims up to a 256-bit key size. In this section we analyze the
security of mv3 against various kinds of cryptanalytic attacks.
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4.1 Tests
We ran the cipher through several tests. First, we used two well-known batteries
of general tests. One is Marsaglia’s time-tested DIEHARD collection [Mar97],
and the other is the NIST set of tests used to assess AES candidates [R+01]
(with corrections as per [KUH04]). Both test suites were easily cleared by mv3.
In light of attacks on the first few output bytes of rc4 [MS01,Mir02], the
most popular stream cipher, we tested the distribution of the initial double words
of mv3 (by choosing a random 160-bit key and generating the first double word
of the output). No anomalies were found.
rc4’s key stream is also known to have correlations between the least sig-
nificant bits of bytes one step away from each other [Gol97]. Neither of the two
collections of tests specifically targets bits in similar positions of the output’s
double words. To compensate for that, we ran both DIEHARD and NIST’s tests
on the most and the least significant bits of 32-bit words of the key stream.
Again, none of the tests raised a flag.
4.2 Time/Memory/Data Tradeoff Attacks
There are two main types of TMDTO (time/memory/data tradeoff) attacks on
stream ciphers.
The first type consists of attacks that try to invert the function f : State −→
Output (see, for example, [BS00]). In order to prevent attacks of this type, the
size of the internal state should be at least twice larger than the key length.
In mv3, the size of the internal state is more than 11,000 bits, and hence there
are no TMDTO attacks of this type faster than exhaustive key search for keys
of less than 5,500 bits length. Our table sizes are larger than what one may
expect to be necessary to make adequate security claims, but we have chosen
our designs so that we can keep our analysis of the components transparent, and
computational overhead per word of output minimal. We intend to return to
this in a future paper and propose an algorithm where the memory is premium,
based on different principles for light weight applications.
The second type consists of attacks that try to invert the function g :
(Key, IV ) −→ Output (see, for example, [HS05]). The IV should be at least
as long as the key – as we have mandated in our key initialization – in order
to prevent such attacks faster than exhaustive key search. We note again that
if the IV ’s are used in some predictable way (for example, initialized to zero
at the beginning of the encryption session and then incremented sequentially),
then the effective size of the IV is much smaller, and this may enable a faster
TMDTO attack. However, in order to overcome this problem the IV does not
have to be “very random”. The only thing needed is that the attacker will not
be able to know which IV will be used in every encryption session. This can
be achieved by initializing the IV in the beginning of the session using some
(possibly insecure) publicly known pseudo-random number generator and then
incrementing it sequentially.
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4.3 Guess-and-Determine Attacks
A guess-and-determine attack against rc4 appears in [K+98]. The attack, adapted
to mv3, has the following form:
1. The attacker guesses the values of all the 32 words in buffers A and B in
some loop of mv3, and the values of j, c, x in the beginning of the loop.
2. Using the guessed values of the words in B, the attacker traces the value of
j during the whole loop.
3. Using the output stream and the guessed values, the attacker traces the value
of x during the whole loop.
4. Using the update rule of x and the knowledge of j, the attacker gets the
values of 32 words in the T array. If the attacker encounters a word whose
value is already known to her, she checks whether the values match, and if
not, discards the initial guess.
5. The attacker moves on to the next loop. Note that due to the knowledge of
buffer A and some of the words T [j], the attacker can trace the update of c
and of the T register.
6. Each “collision” in the T array supplies the attacker with a 32-bit filtering
condition. Since the attacker started by guessing 66 32-bit words, finding 70
collisions should be sufficient to discard all the wrong guesses and find the
right one. In 10 loops we expect to find more than 70 such collisions, and
hence 214 bits of key stream will be sufficient for the attacker to find the
internal state of the cipher.
7. Once the attacker knows the internal state, she can compute the entire out-
put stream without knowing the key.
However, the time complexity of this attack is quite large – more than 22000,
since the attacker starts with guessing more than 2000 bits of the state. Hence,
this attack is slower than exhaustive key search for keys of less then 2000 bits
length.
4.4 Guess-and-Determine Attacks Using the Several Least
Significant Bits of the Words
Most of the operations in mv3 allow the attacker to focus the attack on the
k least significant bits, thus dramatically reducing the number of bits guessed
in the beginning of the attack. We consider two reasonable attacks along these
lines.
The first attack concentrates on the least significant bit of the output words.
In this case, since the least significant bit of c is fixed to 1, the attacker can
disregard c at all. However, in this case the attacker cannot trace the values of j,
and guessing them all the time will require a too high time complexity. Hence,
it seems that this attack is not applicable to mv3.
The second attack concentrates on the eight least significant bits of every
output word. If there were no rotations in the update and output rules, the
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attacker would indeed be able to use her guess to trace the values of j and the
eight least significant bits in all the words of the internal state. This would result
in an attack with time complexity of about 2600. However, the rotations cause
several difficulties for such an attack:
1. Due to the rotations, the values the attacker knows after her initial guess
are bits 24− 31 of the words in buffer C, bits 16− 23 of the words in buffer
B, and bits 0− 7 of the words in buffer A (these are the bits that affect the
eight lsb’s of the output words). Yet the attacker still does not know the
eight lsb’s of the words in buffer B and hence cannot find the value of j.
2. If the attacker rolls the arrays to the previous loop, she can find the eight
lsb’s of the words in buffer B. However, the attacker cannot use her guess
to get information from the previous loop. In that loop she knows bits 0− 7
of the words in buffer B and bits 16 − 23 of the words in buffer C, but in
order to compare the information with the eight lsb’s of the output stream,
she needs bits 16− 23 of the words in buffer B and bits 24− 31 of the words
in buffer C. Therefore, the guesses in consecutive loops cannot be combined
together.
Hence, it seems that both of the attacks cannot be applied, unless the attacker
guesses the full values of all the words in two buffers, which leads to the attack
described in subsection 4.3 (with a time complexity of more than 22000).
4.5 Linear Distinguishing Attacks
Linear distinguishing attacks aim at distinguishing the cipher output from ran-
dom streams, using linear approximations of the non-linear function used in the
cipher – in our case, the random walk.
In [CHJ02], Coppersmith et al. developed a general framework to evaluate
the security of several types of stream ciphers with respect to these attacks. It
appears that the structure of mv3 falls into this framework, to which [CHJ02,
Theorem 6] directly applies:
Theorem 1. Let ǫ be the bias of the best linear approximation one can find for
pairs xi, xi+1, and let AN (a) be the number of equations of type (3.1) that hold
for the sequence ym, ym+1, . . . . Then the statistical distance between the cipher
and the random string is bounded from above by√√√√ N∑
a=1
AN (a)ǫ2a. (4.1)
Note that for ǫ ≪ 1/2, the bound (4.1) is dominated by the term with the
smallest a, which equals to 12 in our case. Since the relation between xi and xi+1
is based on a random walk, ǫ is expected to be very small. Since the statistical
distance is of order ǫ24, we expect that the cipher cannot be distinguished from a
random string using a linear attack, even if the attacker uses a very long output
stream for the analysis.
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4.6 Related-Key Attacks and Key Schedule Considerations
Related key attacks study the relation between the key streams derived from
two unknown, but related, secret keys. These attacks can be classified into dis-
tinguishing attacks, that merely try to distinguish between the key stream and
a random stream, and key recovery attacks, that try to find the actual values of
the secret keys.
One of the main difficulties in designing the key schedule of a stream cipher
with a very large state is the vulnerability to related-key distinguishing attacks.
Indeed, if the key schedule is not very complicated and time consuming, an
attacker may be able to find a relation between two keys that propagates to a
very small difference in the generated states. Such small differences can be easily
detected by observing the first few words of the output stream.
It appears that this difficulty applies to the current key schedule of mv3.
For long keys, an attacker can mount a simple related-key distinguishing attack
on the cipher. Assume that keylength = 8192/t. Then in any step of the key
initialization phase, every word of the key affects exactly t words in the T array,
after which the main loop of the cipher is run eight times and the output stream
is xored (bit-wise) to the content of the T array. The same is repeated with the
IV replacing the key in the IV initialization phase.
The attacker considers encryption under the same key with two IV s that
differ only in one word. Since the key is the same in the two encryptions, the
entire key initialization phase is also the same. After the first step of the IV
initialization, the intermediate values differ in exactly t words in the T array.
Then, the main loop is run eight times. Using the random walk assumption, we
estimate that, with probability (1− t/256)256, each of the corresponding words
in the respective T arrays used in these eight loops are equal, making the output
stream equal in both encryptions. Hence, with probability (1 − t/256)256, after
the first step of the IV initialization the arrays A, B, and C are equal in both
encryptions and the respective T arrays differ only in t words.
The same situation occurs in the following three steps of the IV initialization.
Therefore, with probability
(1 − t/256)256 · (1 − 2t/256)256 · (1− 3t/256)256 · (1 − 4t/256)256 (4.2)
all of the corresponding words used during the entire initialization phase are
equal in the two encryptions. Then with probability (1 − 4t/256)32 all of the
corresponding words used in the first loop of the key stream generation are also
equal in the two encryptions, resulting in two equal key streams. Surely this can
be easily recognized by the attacker after observing the key stream generated in
the first loop.
In order to distinguish between mv3 and a random cipher, the attacker has
to observe about
M = (1−t/256)−256·(1−2t/256)−256·(1−3t/256)−256·(1−4t/256)−256·(1−4t/256)−32
(4.3)
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pairs of related IV s, and for each pair she has to check whether there is equality
in the first 32 key stream words. Hence, the data and time complexities of the
attack are about 210M . For keys of length at least 384 bits, this attack is faster
than exhaustive key search. Note that (somewhat counter intuitively) the attack
becomes more efficient as the length of the key is increased. The attack is most
efficient for 8192-bit keys, where the data complexity is about 210 bits of key
stream encrypted under the same key and 215 pairs of related IV s, and the time
complexity is less than 232 cycles. For keys of length at most 256 bits, the data
and time complexities of the attack are at least 2618 and hence the related-key
attack is much slower than exhaustive key search.
If we try to speed up the key schedule by reducing the number of loops
performed at each step of the key schedule, the complexity of the related-key
attack is reduced considerably. For example, if the number of loops is reduced
to four (instead of eight), the complexity of the related-key attack becomes
M ′ = (1−t/256)−128·(1−2t/256)−128·(1−3t/256)−128·(1−4t/256)−128·(1−4t/256)−32
(4.4)
In this case, the attack is faster than exhaustive key search for keys of length at
least 320 bits. If the number of loops is further reduced to two, the complexity
of the attack becomes
M ′′ = (1−t/256)−64·(1−2t/256)−64·(1−3t/256)−64·(1−4t/256)−64·(1−4t/256)−32
(4.5)
and then the attack is faster than exhaustive search for keys of length at least
224 bits.
If the key schedule is speed up by inserting the output of the eight loops into
the T array, instead of xoring it bit-wise to the content of the T array (as was
proposed in a previous variant of the cipher), the complexity of the related-key
attack drops to
M ′′′ = ((1− t/256)−256)4 (4.6)
In this case, the attack is faster than exhaustive key search even for 256-bit keys.
Hence, the related-key attack described above is a serious obstacle to speeding
up the key schedule. However, we note that the related-key model in general, and
in particular its requirement of obtaining a huge number of encryptions under
different related-IV pairs, is quite unrealistic.
4.7 Other Kinds of Attacks
We subjected the cipher to other kinds of attacks, including algebraic attacks
and attacks exploiting classes of weak keys. We did not find any discrepancies
in these cases.
5 Summary
We have proposed a new fast and secure stream cipher, mv3. The main attributes
of the cipher are efficiency in software, high security, and its basis upon clearly
analyzable components.
15
Keller, Miller, Mironov, and Venkatesan The MV3 stream cipher
The cipher makes use of new rapidly mixing random walks, to ensure the
randomness in the long run. The randomness in the short run is achieved by
revolving buffers that are easily implemented in software, and break short cor-
relations between the words of the internal state.
The cipher is word-based, and hence is most efficient on 32-bit processors.
On a Pentium IV, the cipher runs with a speed of 4.8 clocks a byte.
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A Appendix: Mathematical Background
The good long term randomness properties of the internal state of mv3 are
achieved by updates using rapidly mixing random walks. Actually, the walks are
only pseudo-random since the cipher is fully deterministic, but we desire the
update rule to be as close as possible to a random walk. In this appendix we
recall some mathematics used to study random walks, such as expander graphs
and the rapid mixing property. Afterwards, we describe two particular types of
random walks used in the mv3 cipher: a well-known random walk in the additive
group Z/2nZ, and a novel random walk that mixes addition with multiplication
operations.
A.1 Rapidly Mixing Random Walks and Expander Graphs
Recall that a random walk on a graph starts at a node z0, and at each step
moves to a node connected by one of its adjacent edges at random. A lazy
random walk is the same, except that it stays at the same node with probability
1/2, and otherwise moves to an adjacent node at random. Intuitively, a random
walk is called “rapidly mixing” if, after a relatively short time, the distribution
of the state of the walk is close to the uniform distribution — regardless of the
initial distribution of the walk.
Next, we come to the notion of expander graph. Let Γ be an undirected
k-regular graph on N < ∞ vertices. Its adjacency operator acts on L2(Γ ) by
summing the values of a function at the neighbors of a given vertex:
(Af)(x) =
∑
x∼y
f(y) . (A.1)
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The spectrum of A is contained in the interval [−k, k]. The trivial eigenvalue
λ = k is achieved by the constant eigenvector; if the graph is connected then
this eigenvalue has multiplicity 1, and all other eigenvalues are strictly less than
k. A sequence of k-regular graphs (where the number of vertices tends to infinity)
is customarily called a sequence of expanders if all nontrivial eigenvalues λ of all
the graphs in the sequence satisfy the bound |λ| ≤ k−c for an absolute constant
c. We shall take a slightly more liberal tack here and consider graphs which
satisfy the weaker eigenvalue bound |λ| ≤ k − c(logN)−A for some constant
A ≥ 0.
The importance of allowing the lenient eigenvalue bound |λ| ≤ k−c(logN)−A
is that a random walk on such a graph mixes in polylog(N) time, even if A >
0. More precisely, we have the following estimate (see, for example, [JMV05,
Proposition 3.1]).
Proposition A.1 Let Γ be a regular graph of degree k on N vertices. Suppose
that the eigenvalue λ of any nonconstant eigenvector satisfies the bound |λ| ≤ σ
for some σ < k. Let S be any subset of the vertices of Γ , and x be any vertex in
Γ . Then a random walk of any length at least log 2N/|S|
1/2
log k/σ starting from x will
land in S with probability at least |S|2N =
|S|
2|Γ | .
Indeed, with σ = k − c(logN)−A, the random walk becomes evenly distributed
in the above sense after O((logN)A+1) steps.
Next, we come to the issue of estimating the probability that the random walk
returns to a previously visited node. This is very important for cryptographic
purposes, since short cycles lead to relations which an attacker can exploit. The
following result gives a very precise estimate of how unlikely it is that a random
walk returns to the vertex it starts from. More generally, it shows that if one has
any set S consisting of, say, one quarter of all nodes, then the number of visits
of the random walk to this set will be exceptionally close to that of a purely
random walk in the sense that it will obey a Chernoff type bound. This in turn
allows one to show that the idealized cipher passes all the moment tests.
Theorem A.2 ([Gi98, Theorem 2.1]) Consider a random walk on a k-regular
graph Γ on N vertices for which the second-largest eigenvalue of the adjacency
operator A equals k − εk, ε > 0. Let S be a subset of the vertices of Γ , and tn
the random variable of how many times a particular walk of n steps along the
graph lands in S. Then, as sampled over all random walks, one has the following
estimate for any x > 0:
Prob
[ ∣∣∣∣tn − n |S||Γ |
∣∣∣∣ ≥ x
]
≤
(
1 +
xε
10n
)
e−x
2ε/(20n) . (A.2)
Thus even with a moderately small value of ε, the random walk avoids
dwelling in any one place overly long. The strength of the Chernoff type bound
(A.2) is also useful for ruling out other substitutes for random walks because
of their non-random behavior. For example, it has been shown by Klimov and
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Shamir [KS04] that iterates of their T -functions on n-bit numbers cycle through
all n-bit numbers exactly once, whereas our random walks will have very large
expected return times.
In practice, algorithms often actually consider random walks on directed
graphs. The connection between rapid mixing of directed graphs (with corre-
sponding adjacency/transition matrix M) and undirected graphs is as follows.
A result of J. Fill shows that if the additive reversalization (whose adjacency
matrix is M +M t) or multiplicative reversalization (whose adjacency matrix is
MM t) rapidly mixes, then the lazy random walk on the directed version also
rapidly mixes. From this it is easy to derive the effect of having no self-loops
as well. Moreover, if the undirected graph has expansion, then so does the di-
rected graph — provided it has an Eulerian orientation. It is important to note
that this implication can also be used to greatly improve poorly mixing graphs.
For example, we will present a graph in Theorem A.4 which involves additive
reversalization in an extreme case: where the original graph is definitely not
an expander (the random walk mixes only in time proportional to the number
of vertices N), yet the random walk on the additive reversalization mixes in
polylog(N) time.
Expander graphs are natural sources of (pseudo)randomness, and have nu-
merous applications as extractors, de-randomizers, etc. (see [HLW06]). However,
there are a few practical problems that have to be resolved before expanders can
be used in cryptographic applications. One of these, as mentioned above, is a
serious security weakness: the walks in such a graph have a constant probability
of returning to an earlier node in constant number of steps. It is possible to solve
this problem by adding the current state (as a binary string) to that of another
process which has good short term properties, but this increases the cache size.
In addition, if the graph has large directed girth (i.e. no short cycles), then the
short term return probabilities can be minimized or even eliminated.
A.2 Additive Random Walks on Z/2nZ
Most of the random walks used in the cipher, namely the random walks used
in the updates of j, x, and T , are performed in the additive group Z/2nZ. The
mixing properties of these walks can be studied using results on Cayley graphs
of this group. In general, given a group G with a set of generators S, the Cayley
graph X(G,S) of G with respect to S is the graph whose vertices consist of
elements of G, and whose edges connect pairs (g, gsi), for all g ∈ G and si ∈ S.
Alon and Roichman [AR94] gave a detailed study of the expansion proper-
ties of abelian Cayley graphs, viewed as undirected graphs. They showed that
X(G,S) is an expander when S is a randomly chosen subset of G whose size is
proportional to log |G|. More precisely, they have shown the following:
Theorem A.3 ([AR94]). For every 0 < δ < 1 there is a positive constant
c = c(δ) such that the following assertion holds. Let G be a finite abelian group,
and let S be a random set of c log |G| elements of G. Then the expected value of
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the second largest eigenvalue of the normalized adjacency matrix of X(G,S) is
at most 1− δ.
The normalized adjacency matrix is simply the adjacency matrix, divided
by the degree of the graph. Thus, in light of the results of the last section, the
proposition implies that these random abelian Cayley graphs are expanders, and
hence random walks on them mix rapidly.
Using second-moment methods it can be shown that the graph is ergodic (and
also that the length of the shortest cycle is within a constant factor of log |Γ |)
with overwhelming probability over the choice of generators. The significance of
this is that we need not perform a lazy random walk, which would introduce
undesirable short term correlations as well as waste cycles and compromise the
cryptographic strength.
In mv3, the rapid mixing of the random walks updating x, j and T follows
from the theorem of Alon and Roichman. For example, consider the update rule
of x:
x← x+ T [j],
The update rule corresponds to a random walk on the Cayley graph X(G,S)
where G is the additive group Z/2nZ and S consists of the 256 elements of the
T register. Note that we have |S| = 4 log2(|G|). In order to apply the theorem of
Alon and Roichman we need that the elements of the T array will be random and
that the walk will be random, that is, that j will be chosen each time randomly
in {0, . . . , 255}. Hence, assuming that j and T are uniformly distributed, we have
a rapid mixing property for x. Similarly, one can get rapid mixing property for
j using the randomness of x.
A.3 Non-linear Random Walks
In order to introduce some nonlinearity to the cipher, we use a multiplier c
that affects the cipher output in a multiplicative way. The multiplier itself is
updated using a nonlinear random walk that mixes addition and multiplication
operations. The idealized model of this random walk is described in the following
theorem:
Theorem A.4 Let N and r be relatively prime positive integers greater than
1, and r¯ an integer such that rr¯ ≡ 1 (mod N). Let Γ be the 4-valent graph on
Z/NZ in which each vertex x is connected to the vertices r(x + 1), r(x − 1),
r¯x+ 1, and r¯x− 1. Then there exists a positive constant c > 0, depending only
on r, such that all nontrivial eigenvalues λ of the adjacency matrix of Γ satisfy
the bound
|λ| ≤ 4 −
c
(logN)2
, (A.3)
or are of the form
λ = 4 cos(2πk/N) for k satisfying rk ≡ k (mod N).
In particular, if N is a power of 2 and (r−1, N) = 2, then Γ is a bipartite graph
for which all eigenvalues not equal to ±4 satisfy (A.3).
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The proof of the theorem can be found in Appendix B. The result means
that for a fixed r, Γ is an expander graph in the looser sense that its eigenvalue
separation is at least c/(logN)2 for N large. This is still enough to guarantee
that the random walk on the graph mixes rapidly (i.e. in polylog(N) time).
We note that although we use an additive notation, the theorem holds for
any cyclic group, for example a multiplicative group in which the multiplication
by r corresponds to exponentiation (this is the non-linearity we are referring to).
Also the expressions r(x ± 1), r¯x ± 1 may be replaced by r(x ± g), r¯x ± g for
any integer g relatively prime to N . Additionally, the expansion remains valid if
a finite number of extra relations of this form are added.
We also note that it was observed by Klawe [Kla81] that graphs of the form
described in the theorem cannot be expanders with a constant eigenvalue sepa-
ration, i.e. the assertion of the theorem is false without the logarithmic terms in
the denominator. Even so, this would not change the polynomial dependence of
logN in the mixing time, but only improve its exponent.
The operation used in the mv3 cipher algorithm itself is slightly different: it
involves not only addition steps, but also a squaring or cubing step. Though this
is not covered directly the Theorem, it is similar in spirit. We have run extensive
numerical tests and found that this operation can in fact greatly enhance the
eigenvalue separation, apparently giving eigenvalue bounds of the form |λ| ≤ σ
for some constant σ < 4 (Klawe’s theorem does not apply to this graph). Thus
the squaring or cubing operations are not covered by the theoretical bound (A.3),
but empirically give stronger results anyhow.
B Appendix: Proof of Theorem A.4
We begin with some considerations in harmonic analysis. We may write the
adjacency operator on L2(Γ ) = L2(Z/NZ) as
A = MP + P tM = (MP ) + (MP )t , (B.1)
where
(Mf)(a) = f(a+ 1) + f(a− 1) (B.2)
and
(Pf)(a) = f(ra) , (P tf)(a) = f(r¯a) . (B.3)
The additive characters of Z/NZ play an important role. They are indexed by
integers k ∈ Z/NZ as follows:
χ = χk : a 7→ e
2πika/N . (B.4)
These characters are eigenfunctions of M with eigenvalue λχ = χ(1)+χ(−1), so
that λχk = 2 cos(2πk/N). Furthermore Pχ = χ
r, which means Pχk = χrk and
P tχk = χr¯k.
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The operator A is self-adjoint, so its spectrum may be analyzed by means of
the Rayleigh quotient. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show the existence of
a constant c > 0 such that
max
v⊥1
∣∣∣∣〈Av, v〉〈v, v〉
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4 − c(logN)2 . (B.5)
Here 1 denotes the constant function on the graph, which is the trivial character
χ0, and 〈v, w〉 =
∑N
j=1 vjwj denotes the L
2-inner product of functions on Γ .
Every vector v ∈ L2(Γ ) has an expansion of the form v =
∑
cχ · χ in terms
of the basis of characters χk ; the condition that v ⊥ 1 is simply equivalent to
requiring that cχ0 = 0.
Let us now calculate the inner products in (B.5) for v =
∑
χ6=1 cχ · χ, using
the fact that 〈χ, χ′〉 = N if χ = χ′, and 0 otherwise. First, 〈v, v〉 =
∑
N |cχ|2.
As
Aχk = MPχk + P
tMχk = Mχrk + P
tλkχk = λrkχrk + λkχr¯k , (B.6)
χk is an eigenfunction of Awith eigenvalue 2λk if k ≡ rk (mod N). This accounts
for the explicit eigenvalues which are mentioned in the statement of the theorem.
We have that
Av =
N−1∑
k=1
ck λrk χrk +
N−1∑
k=1
ck λk χr¯k , (B.7)
where we have set ck = cχk for notational convenience. The inner product 〈Av, v〉
satisfies
〈Av, v〉 =
N−1∑
k,ℓ=1
ck cℓ [λrk〈χrk, χℓ〉 + λk〈χr¯k, χℓ〉 ]
= N
N−1∑
k=1
ck crk λrk +N
N−1∑
ℓ=1
cℓ crℓ λrℓ
≤ N
N−1∑
k=1
|ck| |crk| |λrk| +N
N−1∑
ℓ=1
|crℓ| |cℓ| |λrℓ| .
(B.8)
We are now reduced to a problem about quadratic forms. For 1 ≤ k, ℓ ≤ N − 1,
let
ak,ℓ =


|λk|+ |λℓ|, k ≡ rℓ (mod N) and ℓ ≡ rk (mod N)
|λk|, k ≡ rℓ (mod N) and ℓ 6≡ rk (mod N)
|λℓ|, k 6≡ rℓ (mod N) and ℓ ≡ rk (mod N)
0, otherwise.
(B.9)
We need to show the existence of a constant c > 0 for which
N−1∑
k,ℓ=1
ak,ℓ yk yℓ ≤
(
4 −
c
(logN)2
) N−1∑
k=1
y2k (B.10)
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for any N − 1 real numbers y1, . . . , yN−1. Since the spectrum coming from the
characters χk for which rk ≡ k (mod N) has already been accounted form, we
may assume yk = 0 for such k, and modify (B.9) so that
ak,ℓ = aℓ,k = 0 if rk ≡ k (mod N). (B.11)
For this we use the following inequality.
Lemma B.1 (Proposition 8 in [JM85]) Let (aij) be a symmetric n × n real
matrix whose entries are nonnegative. Let (γij) be an n × n real matrix with
positive entries for which γijγji = 1. Then∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j≤n
aij yi yj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxi≤n

∑
j≤n
γij aij

∑
i≤n
|yi|
2 . (B.12)
Since the proof is short, we have included it here.
Proof: Since 0 ≤ (γ1/2yi±γ−1/2yj)2 = γy2i +γ
−1y2j ± 2yiyj, we may bound∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j≤n
aij yi yj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
1
2
∑
i,j≤n
2 aij |yi| |yj |
≤
1
2
∑
i,j≤n
aij (γij y
2
i + γji y
2
j )
=
∑
i,j≤n
aij γij y
2
i
≤ max
i≤n

∑
j≤n
γij aij

∑
i≤n
|yi|
2 . 
(B.13)
Now we specify which γij to use in bounding our sequence. (In what follows
we closely follow the technique of Jimbo-Maruoka from a different example in
[JM85].) Given an element i ∈ Z/NZ, we let ||i|| denote the distance from
i to NZ. In other words, if i is represented by a residue between 0 and N ,
||i|| = min{i, N − i}. For s ≥ 1 set
as = 1 − s
d
(logN)2
, (B.14)
where d is a small constant (depending on r) which shall be chosen later. Given
an integer m relatively prime to N , we define sm to be the largest integer s such
that rs divides ||2m||. Since ||2m|| ≤ N/2, s = O(logN) and as > 0 provided d
is sufficiently small. We set γkℓ = 1 except in the following cases:
||2k|| < N/(2r) ||2k|| ≥ N/(2r)
||2ℓ|| < N/(2r) γk,rk = ask γrℓ,ℓ = a
−1
sℓ
γrℓ,ℓ = a
−1
sℓ
||2ℓ|| ≥ N/(2r) γk,rk = ask (no exceptions)
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This satisfies the requirement that γk,ℓ γℓ,k = 1. We will choose the constant d
to be smaller yet so that each γkℓ ≤ 1 +
1
2 (1 − cosπ/(2r)), as we may do. To
finish the proof we must now show the existence of a constant c > 0 so that
N−1∑
ℓ=1
γk,ℓ ak,ℓ = γk,rk |λrk| + γk,r¯k |λk| ≤ 4 −
c
(logN)2
(B.15)
for each 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 which does not satisfy rk ≡ k (mod N).
Case I: Assume that ||2k|| ≥ N/(2r). Then
k ∈
[
N
4r
,
N
2
−
N
4r
]
∪
[
N
2
+
N
4r
,N −
N
4r
]
2πk/N ∈
[ π
2r
, π −
π
2r
]
∪
[
π +
π
2r
, 2π −
π
2r
] (B.16)
and |λk| = 2| cos(
2πk
N )| ≤ 2 cos(
π
2r ). Now the lefthand side of (B.15) is bounded
by (1+ 12 (1−cos
π
2r )(2+2 cos(
π
2r )) = 4−4 sin(
π
4r )
4, which is bounded away from
4 by an positive constant depending only on r.
Case II: Now assume that ||2k|| < N/(2r), and that rk is not congruent to
k modulo N . Using the trivial bound that |λk|, |λrk| ≤ 2, the lefthand side of
(B.15) is bounded by 2(γk,rk+γk,r¯k). Both cases in the first column of the table
have γk,rk = ask . If ||2r¯k|| ≥ N/(2r), then γk,r¯k = 1 and 1+ask ≤ 2−d/(logN)
2,
so that the bound in (B.15) is satisfied so long as c < 2d, which it may be chosen
to be.
The only remaining situation is when both ||2k|| < N/(2r) and ||2r¯k|| <
N/(2r), where the left hand side of (B.15) is bounded by 2(ask + a
−1
sr¯k). Let
−N/(2r) < m < N/(2r) be the integer congruent to 2r¯k modulo N , i.e. so
that ||2r¯k|| = |m|. Then rm ≡ 2k (mod N). Yet since −N/2 < rm < N/2,
||2k|| = |rm|. We may assume that m 6= 0, for otherwise 2k ≡ 2rk ≡ 0 (mod N);
this implies k ≡ rk (mod N) if N is odd, and k ≡ rk ≡ N/2 if N is even (since
then r is odd). Therefore r divides ||2k|| = |rm| to exactly one more power than
it divides ||2r¯k|| = |m|. Thus sr¯k = sk − 1. Now
a−1s =
(
1−
s d
(logN)2
)−1
= 1 +
s d
(logN)2
+O
((
s d
(logN)2
)2)
= 1 +
s d
(logN)2
+O
(
d2
(logN)2
)
since s = O(logN). Therefore (ask + a
−1
sr¯k) equals
1 − sk
d
(logN)2
+
(
1− sr¯k
d
(logN)2
)−1
≤ 2 − (sk − sr¯k)
d
(logN)2
+ O
(
d2
(logN)2
)
,
which is smaller than 2 − c/(logN)2 for some sufficiently small c > 0. This
concludes the proof of Theorem A.4.
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C Appendix: Related Work
Theoretically, the requirements for stream ciphers are well understood: crypto-
graphically secure pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) exist if and only
if one-way functions exist [H+99], and such a generator would be ideal as a
stream cipher. However such known constructions would yield prohibitively slow
implementations in practice. The heart of such constructions involves a one-way
function f and a hard-core bit extractor B(x). If f is based on an algebraic
problem such as dlog or factoring, the resulting cipher is quite slow even
when B(x) is simple and constitutes outputting some bits of x. If f is based on
block ciphers, then B(x, r) = parity(x∧r) is often based on the Goldreich-Levin
theorem [GL89]. Computing this parity bit takes on the average n2 cycles, where
n is the machine word size. One can speed this up with some precomputations
and make it into a practical algorithm with provable properties (e.g. the VRA
cipher [ARV95], which has the disadvantage of needing to store a large array of
random bits.)
Computerized methods for random number generation go back to von Neu-
mann [Neu51]. Many designers of PRNGs used clever techniques to control corre-
lations between adjacent outputs of their algorithms, but few generators needed
it as badly as LFSR-based algorithms [Golo67]. Indeed, since the Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm [Mas69] efficiently determines the state of an LFSR of length
n given only 2n bits, all LFSR-based constructions necessarily must hide the
LFSR’s exact output sequence.
Historically, the first method to hedge LFSR’s from the Berlekamp-Massey
attack was due to Geffe [Gef73]. It combines outputs of three synchronously
clocked LFSR’s to produce one stream of output bits, using one of them as a
multiplexer. This is a lossy combiner in the sense it outputs only one of three
bits generated by the LFSR’s. It was broken by Siegenthaler [Sie84], who also
broke another 3-way non-linear combiner of Bruer [Bru84]. Another attempt by
Pless [Ple77] — to make use of non-linear J-K flip-flops to combine eight LFSR’s
into one key stream — was broken shortly thereafter [Rub79].
A recommended approach to designing LFSR-based ciphers is the shrinking
generator [CKM93]. It outputs only one quarter of its generated bits, but has
proved to be secure after 10 years of wide use and extensive scrutiny.
Most combiners considered in the LFSR literature are constructed from two
building blocks: a (non)linear function that mixes inputs of several generators
(this function may either be memoryless or stateful, though usually of very small
memory), and a clocking rule that controls the clock of some LFSR’s. None of
them uses deep buffers or tries to space LFSR’s outputs using schemes with
guaranteed properties. For attacks on combiners with small memory (up to 4
bits) see [Cou04].
A different approach for combining generators’ outputs is called randomiza-
tion by shuffling [Knu97, Ch. 3.2.2]. Two algorithms popularized by Knuth are
often used in modern generators: the “algorithm M” or MacLaren-Marsaglia
algorithm [MM65], and the “algorithm B” or Bays-Durham algorithm [BD76].
Both are analogous to our proposal in the sense that they store the generator’s
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output in a buffer and output the stored elements out of order. The fundamen-
tal difference — and source of weakness — of both algorithms M and B is that
they only reorder elements without modifying them. We omit the details. For
example, the Bays-Durham algorithm operators as follows:
Bays-Durham Algorithm.
Y is an auxiliary variable, T is the size of the buffer V , m is the range of the
generator 〈Xn〉. Initially V is filled with T elements X0,. . . ,XT−1. Iterate the
following:
1. set j ← ⌊TY/m⌋.
2. set Y ← V [j].
3. output Y .
4. set V [j]← next element of 〈Xn〉.
Since the position of the output element is completely determined by the
previous element, the construction does not improve cryptographic properties of
the cipher. If Y is chosen by an independent process (as in the algorithm M),
there is still a 1/T chance that two elements Xi and Xi+1 will end up next to
each other in the output sequence. More generally, the distance between Xi and
Xi+1 is distributed according to a geometric distribution and has average T .
Depending on the generator, this property may be exploitable.
Klimov and Shamir [KS04] proposed a class of invertible mappings {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n called T -functions that allow introduction of non-linearity using elemen-
tary register operations (∨,∧,⊕, ∗, +,−, x 7→ x, x 7→ −x,≪). The T -functions
are particularly well suited for fast software implementations. An example of
such a function is f(x) = x + (x2 ∨ 5) (mod 2n), for which the sequence xi+1 =
f(xi) spans the entire domain in one cycle. Each iteration requires only 3 cy-
cles. Nevertheless, by choosing n = 64 and outputting the top half of xi (i.e.
H(xi) =msb32(xi)), they discovered that the resulting pseudo-random sequence
passed the statistical test suite for aes candidates with significance level α =
0.01, which is better than some of the aes candidates. Surprisingly, the best
known cryptanalytic attacks take time 2cn, where c is a constant. These at-
tacks depend on using the structure of the iterated output: this structure is
important for proving the properties of these functions, and slightly altering the
construction would destroy the properties. These functions allow some of their
parameters be chosen at random subject to certain constraints.
The methods in this paper allow us to resist such attacks better, with minimal
overhead, and extend the length of the underlying key for the stream cipher. We
do not know how to extend the known attacks in this new model.
27
